We introduce a logical verification methodology for checking behavioral properties of service-oriented computing systems. Service properties are described by means of SocL, a branching-time temporal logic that we have specifically designed for expressing in an effective way distinctive aspects of services, such as, acceptance of a request, provision of a response, correlation among service requests and responses, etc. Our approach allows service properties to be expressed in such a way that they can be independent of service domains and specifications. We show an instantiation of our general methodology that uses the formal language COWS to conveniently specify services and the expressly developed software tool CMC to assist the user in the task of verifying SocL formulas over service specifications. We demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our methodology by means of the specification and analysis of a case study in the automotive domain.
INTRODUCTION
Service-oriented computing (SOC) is emerging as an evolutionary paradigm for distributed and e-business computing. This new paradigm, which finds its origin in object-oriented and component-based software development, aims at enabling developers to build networks of interoperable and collaborative applications-regardless of the platform where the applications run and of the programming language used to develop them-through the use of independent computational units, called services. Services are loosely coupled reusable components that are built with little or no knowledge about clients and other services involved in their operating environment. In the end, SOC systems deliver application functionalities as services to either end-user applications or other services.
There are, by now, some successful and well-developed instantiations of the general SOC paradigm, for example, Web Services (WSs) and Grid Computing, that exploit the pervasiveness of Internet and related standards. However, current software engineering technologies for SOC remain at the descriptive level and lack rigorous formal foundations. In the development of SOC systems, we are still experiencing a gap between practice (design and implementation) and theory (formal methods and analysis techniques). The challenges come from the necessity of dealing at once with such issues as asynchronous interactions, concurrent activities, workflow coordination, business transactions, failures, resource usage, and security, in a setting where demands and guarantees can be very different for these different components. Many researchers have hence put forward the idea of using process calculi, a cornerstone of current foundational research on specification and verification of concurrent, distributed, and mobile systems through mathematical (mainly algebraic and logical) tools. Indeed, due to their algebraic nature, process calculi convey the compositional programming style of SOC in a distilled form.
A major benefit of using process calculi is that they enjoy a rich repertoire of elegant meta-theories, proof techniques, and analytical tools that can be likely tailored to the needs of SOC. In fact, it has been already argued that type systems, observational equivalences, and modal and temporal logics provide adequate tools to address topics relevant to SOC (e.g., [Meredith and Bjorg 2003; van Breugel and Koshkina 2006] ). In particular, modal and temporal logics have long been used to represent properties of concurrent and distributed systems, owing to their ability to express notions of necessity, possibility, eventuality, etc. (e.g., [Clarke et al. 1999; Bradfield and Stirling 2001; Grumberg and Veith 2008] ). These logics have proved to be suitable for reasoning about the design of complex computing systems because they provide abstract specifications of these systems. Indeed, logics permit expressing systems properties, while process calculi permit describing system behaviours. Moreover, the application of temporal logics to the analysis of systems is often supported by efficient software tools.
By following this line of research, in this article we introduce a logical verification methodology for checking behavioural properties of services. We do not put any specific demand on what a service is; rather, for the sake of generality, we take an abstract point of view. We think of services as computing entities which may have an internal state and can interact with each other and with user applications by, for example, sending/accepting requests, delivering corresponding responses, and cancelling requests on demand. By reasoning at this abstraction level, we can single out some significant classes of service properties that can be expressed in such a general way that is independent of service domains and specifications. Thus, we categorize a service according to the following.
(1) Available. It is always capable of accepting a request.
(2) Parallel. After accepting a request, it can accept further requests before giving a response. (3) Sequential. After accepting a request, it cannot accept further requests before giving a response.
(4) One-shot. After accepting a request, it cannot accept any further requests.
(5) Off-line. It provides an unsuccessful response to each received request. (6) Cancelable. Before a response has been provided, it permits canceling the corresponding request. (7) Revocable. After a successful response has been provided, it permits canceling a previous request. (8) Responsive. It guarantees at least a response to each received request. (9) Single-response. After accepting a request, it provides no more than one response. (10) Multiple-response. After accepting a request, it provides more than one response. (11) No-response. It never provides a response to any accepted request. (12) Reliable. It guarantees a successful response to each received request.
Albeit not exhaustive, the preceding list contains many desirable properties (e.g., [van der Aalst et al. 2003; Alonso et al. 2004; Bocchi et al. 2006] ) of the externally observable behaviour of services.
The previous properties are stated in terms of the visible actions that services may perform. Any of these actions has a type, for example, accept a request, provide a response, etc., and is part of a possibly long-running interaction (also called conversation) started when a client first invokes one of the operations exposed by the service. Thus, according to this abstract point of view, an interaction identifies a collection of actions, each of them corresponding to a single invocation of a service operation. At first sight, then, the service properties could be formulated by properly tailoring an action-based temporal logic among those already proposed in the literature of concurrency theory (e.g., [Hennessy and Milner 1985; De Nicola and Vaandrager 1990; Stirling 2001] ). However, these logics are not expressive enough to, for example, associate a response action to the request acceptance action that originated the interaction. The possible presence of more request actions sharing the same type and interaction name may prevent this association from occurring. Indeed, multiple instances of an interaction can be simultaneously active, since service operations can be independently invoked by several clients. Hence, by taking inspiration from SOC emerging standards, like WS-BPEL [OASIS WSBPEL TC 2007] and WS-CDL [Kavantzas et al. 2004] , to enable the previously mentioned association, we use correlation data as a third attribute of actions that services can do.
The first contribution of this article is the definition of the branching-time temporal logic SocL that, by relying on the actions previously described, is capable effectively expressing distinctive aspects of services and of formalizing the abstract properties previous stated. SocL falls within a large body of research (e.g., [Lawford et al. 1996; Chaki et al. 2004 Chaki et al. , 2005 Baier et al. 2004; Pecheur and Raimondi 2006; ) that aims at supporting the analysis of action-and state-based properties of systems. Indeed, SocL formulas predicate properties of systems in terms of states and state changes, of the actions that are enabled in a given state, and of the actions that are performed when moving from one state to another. Thus, the interpretation domain of SocL formulas are Doubly Labeled Transition Systems (L 2 TSs [De Nicola and Vaandrager 1995] ), namely extensions of Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs) with a labeling function from states to sets of atomic propositions.
Our second contribution is the introduction of a novel verification methodology of service properties. The properties are initially formalized as SocL formulas while preserving their independence from individual service domains and specifications. Afterward, these formulas can be tailored to a given specification of a service by means of abstraction rules that relate actions in the specification with actions of the logic. Then, once a way to get a representation of the service specification in terms of an L 2 TS has been provided, the verification process can take place. While service behaviour could be directly specified using L 2 TSs in principle, practical considerations suggest that it is more convenient to resort to some linguistic formalism. In fact, when used as a specification formalism, L 2 TSs are too low level and, above all, suffer from lack of compositionality in the sense that they offer no means for constructing the L 2 TS of a composed service in terms of the L 2 TSs of its components. On the contrary, linguistic terms are more intuitive and concise notations. Using them, services are built in a compositional way by using the operators provided by the language, and furthermore, they are syntactically finite, even when the corresponding semantic model, perhaps defined in terms of L 2 TSs, is not. Therefore, in this article, we show an instantiation of our methodology that uses COWS (Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services [Lapadula et al. 2007] ) as the language for specifying and combining services, while modeling their dynamic behaviour.
The third contribution of our work is the software tool CMC, namely a verification environment for SocL formulas over COWS's specifications of services. Input to CMC are a COWS term, the SocL formula to be checked, and a set of abstraction rules that are exploited during the verification process for generating the L 2 TS model of the COWS term. The model is generated on-the-fly, hence, depending on the formula to be checked, only a fragment of the overall state space may need to be generated and analyzed in order to produce the correct result. Moreover, when the formula is not satisfied, CMC provides diagnostic information in the form of a computation that makes the verification fail.
We demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our methodology by means of the specification and the analysis of a case study, namely an automotive scenario studied within the EU project SENSORIA [SENSORIA 2005] .
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the syntax and semantics of SocL, while Section 3 presents the model-checker engine for SocL. Section 4 presents COWS's main features in a step-by-step fashion, while modeling a bank service (which is part of the automotive scenario). Section 5 describes the verification environment CMC whose implementation exploits the model-checker engine for SocL presented in Section 3. Section 6 presents the automotive scenario, first through an informal UML-like description then through a formal specification written in COWS. The COWS specification is thoroughly analyzed in Section 7. Final remarks and comparisons with related work are reported in Section 8, while directions for future work are touched upon in Section 9.
THE LOGIC SOCL
SocL is an action-and state-based branching-time logic that makes use of high-level temporal operators drawn from mainstream logics, like CTL [Clarke and Emerson 1981] , ACTL [De Nicola and Vaandrager 1990] , and ACTLW [Meolic et al. 2008] . In this section, we first introduce some preliminary definitions, then define syntax and semantics of SocL , and finally show how the logic can be used to formalize the service properties we have mentioned in Section 1.
Preliminary Definitions
In this section, we report the definitions of the semantic structures upon which the logic relies. They characterize a service in terms of states and predicates that are true in terms of state changes and actions performed when moving from one state to another.
Let Act be a set of elements called observable actions. We will use η to range over 2 Act .
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Definition 2.1 (Labeled Transition System). A labeled transition system (LTS) over the set of observable actions Act is a quadruple Q, q 0 , Act, R with the following properties.
-Q is a set of states. -q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
Act × Q is the transition relation. Now, if we extend an LTS with a labeling function from states to sets of atomic propositions, we get a system with labels also over states, namely a Doubly Labeled Transition System. Definition 2.2 (Doubly Labeled Transition System). A doubly labeled transition system (L 2 TS) over the set of observable actions Act and the set of atomic propositions AP is a tuple Q, q 0 , Act, R, AP, L with the following properties.
-Q is a set of states.
AP is the labeling function.
The main difference between the preceding definitions and the usual ones (as given by De Nicola and Vaandrager [1995] ) is that transitions are labeled by a set of actions rather than by a single action. In particular, the empty set, that is, ∅, that labels transitions during which no observable actions occur, corresponds to the unobservable internal action in the usual definitions. In the sequel, as a matter of notation, instead of (q, η, q ) ∈ R, we may write q η −→ q . Paths within L 2 TSs represent service computations and are defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Path). Let (Q, q 0 , Act, R, AP, L) be an L 2 TS, and let q ∈ Q.
-σ is a path from q if σ = q (the empty path from q) or σ is a (possibly infinite) sequence of transitions (q 1 , η 1 , q 2 )(q 2 , η 2 , q 3 ) . . ., with q 1 = q and (q i , η i , q i+1 ) ∈ R for all i ≥ 1. -A full-path is a path that cannot be further extended: it is infinite or ends in a state without outgoing transitions. We write path(q) for the set of all full-paths from q.
) is the ith transition in a path σ , then we will write σ (i), σ {i}, and σ (i +1)
to indicate q i , η i , and q i+1 , respectively.
SocL Syntax and Semantics
We start introducing the set of observable actions which SocL is based upon. As we said in Section 1, the actions of the logic should correspond to the actions performed by service providers and service consumers and are characterized by three attributes: type, interaction name, and correlation data. 1 Moreover, to enable capturing correlation data used to link together actions executed as part of the same interaction, they may also contain variables that we call correlation variables. In the sequel, we will usually write val to denote a generic correlation value and var to denote a generic correlation variable. For a given correlation variable var, its binding occurrence will be denoted by var; all remaining occurrences, called free, will be denoted by var.
Definition 2.4 (SocL Actions). SocL actions have the form t(i, c), where t is the type of the action, i is the name of the interaction which the action is part of, and c is a tuple of correlation values and variables identifying the interaction. (i and c can be omitted whenever they do not play any role). We assume that variables in the same tuple are pairwise distinct. We will say that an action is closed if it does not contain variables. We will use Act v to denote the set of all actions, α as a generic element of Act v (the emphasizing underlying fact that the action may contain variable binders), and α as a generic action without variable binders. We will use Act to denote the subset of Act v that only contains closed actions (i.e., actions without variables) and η as a generic subset of Act.
Example 2.5. Action request(charge, 1234, 1) could stand for an action of type request starting an (instance of the) interaction charge which would be identified through the correlation tuple 1234, 1 . A response action corresponding to this request, for example, could be written as response (charge, 1234, 1) . Moreover, if some correlation value is unknown at design time, for example, the identifier 1, a (binder for a) correlation variable id can be used instead, as in the action request (charge, 1234, id) . A corresponding response action could be written as response (charge, 1234, id) , where the (free) occurrence of the correlation variable id indicates the connection with the action where the variable is bound.
To define the syntax of SocL, we rely on an auxiliary logic of actions.
Definition 2.6 (Action Formulas). The language of the action formulas on Act v is defined as follows.
As usual, we will use ff to abbreviate ¬tt and χ ∨ χ to abbreviate ¬(¬χ ∧ ¬χ ). This syntax states that an action formula γ can be either an action α, which may contain variable binders, or an action formula χ , which is a boolean compositions of unobservable internal actions τ and observable actions α without variable binders. As we shall also clarify later, the distinction between action formulas γ and χ is motivated by two reasons: (1) some logical operators can accept as argument only action formulas without variable binders, and (2) actions containing variable binders cannot be composed.
Satisfaction of an action formula is determined with respect to a set of closed actions that represent the observable actions actually executed by the service under analysis. Therefore, since action formulas may contain variables, to define their semantics, we introduce the notion of substitution and the partial function match that checks matching between an action and a closed action and, if it is defined, returns a substitution.
Definition 2.7 (Substitutions). Substitutions, ranged over by ρ, are functions mapping correlation variables to values and are written as collections of pairs of the form var/val. The empty substitution is denoted by ∅. Application of substitution ρ to a formula φ, written φ ρ, has the effect of replacing every free occurrence of var in φ with val, for each var/val ∈ ρ.
Definition 2.8 (Matching Function). The partial function match from Act v × Act to substitutions is defined by structural induction by means of auxiliary partial functions ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, Vol. 21, No. 3, Article 16, Pub. date: June 2012. defined over syntactic subcategories of Act v through the following rules:
where (e, c) stands for a tuple with first element e, and stands for the empty tuple. Notably, an action containing free variable occurrences cannot match any closed action.
Example 2.9. Let us consider again the actions introduced in Example 2.5. Then, we have match(response(charge, 1234, 1), response(charge, 1234, 1)) = ∅ and also match(request (charge, 1234, id) , request(charge, 1234, 1)) = {id/1}. Instead, match(request (charge, 1234, id) , response(charge, 1234, 1)) is not defined, since the actions have different types.
Definition 2.10 (Action Formulas Semantics). The satisfaction relation for action formulas is defined over a set of closed actions and a substitution.
where the relation η |= χ is defined as follows.
-η |= tt holds always.
Notation η |= γ ρ means that the formula γ is satisfied over the set of closed actions η under substitution ρ. Since function match (i.e., match e ) is undefined when its first argument contains free variables, the semantics of actions containing free occurrences of correlation variables is undefined as well. Notice also that satisfiability of a formula under a nonempty substitution may be required only in the first case of the preceding definition, because the remaining cases deal with formulas that do not contain variable binders. Finally, the action formula τ is satisfied over the empty set of actions.
To define the syntax of the logic, the last ingredient we need is the set of atomic propositions. They correspond to the properties that can be true over the states of services.
Definition 2.11 (Atomic Propositions). SocL atomic propositions have the form p (i, c) , where p is the name, i is an interaction name, and c is a tuple of correlation values and free variables identifying i. (i and c can be omitted whenever they do not play any role). We will use AP to denote the set of all atomic propositions and π as generic element of AP.
Notably, atomic propositions cannot contain variable binders.
Example 2.12. Proposition accepting request(charge) indicates that a state can accept requests for interaction charge, while proposition accepting cancel (charge, 1234, 1) indicates that a state permits canceling those requests for interaction charge identified by the correlation tuple 1234, 1 . (charge,1234,id) AX response(charge,1234,id) true : after a request for the interaction charge has been accepted, a correlated response must be immediately performed.
A(true ¬response(check,1234) U request (check,1234) true) : the request for the interaction (check,1234), which must always occur, is never proceeded by a response for the same interaction.
A(true ¬response(check,1234) W request (check,1234) true) : the request for the interaction (check,1234), if it ever occurs, is never proceeded by a response for the same interaction.
Definition 2.13 (SocL Syntax). The syntax of SocL formulas is defined as follows.
E and A are existential and universal respectively path quantifiers. X, U , and W are the next, (strong) until, and weak until operators drawn from those first introduced by De Nicola and Vaandrager [1990] and subsequently elaborated, by Meolic et al. [2008] . Intuitively, the formula X γ φ says that in the next state of the path, reached by an action satisfying γ , the formula φ holds. The formula φ χ U γ φ says that φ holds at some future state of the path reached by a last action satisfying γ , while φ holds from the current state until that state is reached, and all the actions executed meanwhile along the path satisfy χ . The formula φ χ W γ φ holds on a path either if the corresponding strong until operator holds or if, for all the states of the path, the formula φ holds and all the actions of the path satisfy χ . Notice that the weak until operator (also called unless) is not derivable from the strong until operator, since disjunction or conjunction of path formulas is not expressible in the syntax of SocL, similarly as with any other pure branching-time temporal logic. Some examples of SocL formulae, together with their intuitive meaning are reported in Table I . The semantics of SocL formulas is only defined for closed formulas, namely those formulas where any free occurrence of a correlation variable is syntactically preceded by its binding occurrence. Given the formulas X γ φ , φ χ U γ φ , and φ χ W γ φ , variables occurring in γ syntactically precede the variables occurring in φ . The interpretation domain of SocL formulas are L 2 TSs over the set of actions Act and the set of atomic propositions AP. To define the semantics of SocL, we use the notion of full-path and the notations σ (i) and σ {i} introduced in Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.14 (SocL Semantics). Let Q, q 0 , Act, R, AP, L be an L 2 TS, q ∈ Q, and σ ∈ path(q). The satisfaction relation of closed SocL formulas is defined as follows.
-q |= true holds always.
σ ( j) |= φ, and ∃ ρ : σ { j} |= γ ρ and σ ( j + 1) |= φ ρ, and
A distinctive feature of SocL is that the satisfaction relation of the next and until operators may define substitutions which are propagated to subformulas. Notably, in the left-hand side of the until operators, we use χ (i.e., closed actions), instead of γ , to prevent writing such formulas as φ request (i,var) U γ φ , whose semantics would require request(i, var) to be performed zero or more times before γ , which could produce undefined or multiple defined bindings on var. This motivates the syntactical constraints on the definition of action formulas (Definition 2.6).
Other useful logic operators can be derived as usual. In particular, the ones that we use in the sequel are the following.
-False stands for ¬ true.
-<γ >φ stands for EX γ φ; this is the diamond operator introduced by Hennessy and Milner [1985] and intuitively states that it is possible to perform an action satisfying γ , thereby reaching a state that satisfies formula φ. -[γ ] φ stands for ¬<γ >¬ φ; this is the box operator introduced by Hennessy and Milner [1985] and states that no matter how a process performs an action satisfying γ , the state it reaches in doing so will necessarily satisfy the formula φ. -Variants of until operators, which do not specify the last action leading to the state at which the formula on the right-hand side holds, can be defined as follows.
-EFφ stands for E(true tt U φ) and means that there is some path that leads to a state at which φ holds; that is, φ eventually holds on some path. -EF γ φ stands for E(true tt U γ φ) and means that there is some path that, by a last action satisfying γ , leads to a state at which φ holds; if φ is true, we say that an action satisfying γ will eventually be performed on some path. -AF γ φ stands for A(true tt U γ φ) and means that an action satisfying γ will be performed in the future along every path and at the reached states φ holds; if φ is true, we say that an action satisfying γ will always eventually be performed. -AG φ stands for ¬ EF ¬ φ and states that φ holds at every state on every path; that is, φ holds globally.
A Few Patterns of Service Properties
We now present how the service properties listed in Section 1 can be expressed as formulas in SocL. To do this, we characterize the set of actions Act v and the set of atomic propositions AP upon which the logic is based as follows.
-Act v contains (at least) the following five types of actions: request, responseOk, responseFail, cancel, and undo. The intended meanings of the actions are as follows. request (i, c) indicates that the action performed by the service starts the interaction i, which is identified by the correlation tuple c. Similarly, responseOk(i, c), responseFail(i, c), and cancel(i, c) correspond to actions that provide a successful response, an unsuccessful response, and a cancellation, respectively, of the interaction i identified by c. undo (i, c) corresponds to an action that undoes the effects of a previous request.
-AP contains (at least) the following three atomic propositions: accepting request (i, c), accepting cancel(i, c), and accepting undo(i, c) , whose meanings are obvious.
For the sake of readability, in the formalization of the properties, we consider correlation tuples composed of only one element.
(1) Available service: AG (accepting request(i) ). This formula means that in every state, the service may accept a request. A weaker interpretation of service availability, meaning that the service accepts a request infinitely often, is given by the formula AG AF (accepting request(i)). (2) Parallel service: AG [request(i,var) ]E(true ¬ (responseOk(i,var) ∨responseFail(i,var)) Uaccepting request(i)). This formula means that the service can accept several requests simultaneously. Indeed, in every state, if a request is accepted, then in some future state, further requests for the same interaction can be accepted before giving a response to the first accepted request. Notably, the responses belong to the same interaction i of the accepted request, and they are correlated by the variable var. This is a clear example of the usefulness of the combined approach based on both actions and propositions. In fact, as we shall further clarify in Section 5, the action request (i, var) corresponds to the acceptance of a request sent by a client, while the proposition accepting request (i) indicates that in the current state, the service is able to accept a request from some client (but it has not received such a request yet). In this way, SocL can easily deal with both performed and potential actions. (¬ accepting request(i) tt U responseOk(i,var) ∨responseFail(i,var) true). In this case, the service can accept at most one request at a time. Indeed, after accepting a request, it cannot accept further requests for the same interaction before replying to the accepted request. (i,var) ∨responseFail(i,var) true). This formula means that the service is ready to accept a cancellation required by the client (fairness towards the client) before possibly providing a response to the accepted request. A different formulation is given by AG [responseOk(i, var) ] ¬EF <cancel (i, var) >true, meaning that the service cannot accept a cancellation after responding to a request (fairness towards the service) (7) Revocable service: EF responseOk (i,var) EF(accepting undo(i, var) ). Again, we can have two interpretations. While the previous formula expresses a sort of weak revocability (i.e., after a successful response has been provided, the service can eventually accept an undo of the corresponding request), the following one corresponds to a stronger interpretation: accepting undo(i, var) tt W undo(i,var) true), since it guarantees that the service can always accept an undo of the request after providing the response. responseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true. The formula states that whenever the service accepts a request, it always eventually provides at least a (successful or unsuccessful) response. (9) Single-response service: AG [request(i, var) ] ¬EF responseOk (i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) EF responseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true. The formula means that whenever the service accepts a request, it cannot provide two or more correlated (successful or unsuccessful) responses, that is, it can only provide at most a single response. (10) Multiple-response service: AG [request(i, var) ] AF responseOk (i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) AF responseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true. Different from the previous formula, here the service always eventually provides two or more responses. (i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true. This formula means that the service never provides a (successful or unsuccessful) response to any accepted request. (12) Reliable service: AG [request(i, var)] AF responseOk (i,var) true. This formula guarantees that the service always eventually provides a successful response to each accepted request. The SocL formulation of these properties is instructive in that it witnesses that the natural language descriptions of the properties can sometimes be interpreted in different ways; therefore, formalization within the logic enforces a choice among different interpretations. Notably, the formulation is given in terms of abstract actions and state predicates, thus, rather than specific properties, the properties we have considered so far represent sorts of generic patterns or classes of properties. From time to time, type/name, interaction and correlation tuple of actions and propositions have to be projected on the actual actions performed by the specific service to be analyzed. They, however, can be easily instantiated, as shown in Section 7.1, and such instantiation can be in principle automated.
MODEL CHECKING FOR SOCL
To assist the verification process of SocL formulas over L 2 TSs, we have developed a bounded, on-the-fly model-checking engine. Figure 1 illustrates the input expected by the SocL model checker and the output it produces. In this section, we illustrate the principles upon which the model-checking engine is based.
The first principle regards the bounded approach. The evaluation of a formula is achieved iteratively: each iteration is allowed to explore the model up to a certain depth until a final boolean answer can be given. The schema of the procedure is shown in Figure 2 . At each iteration, the value of the user-defined parameter MaxDepth (representing the maximal evaluation depth for the current iteration) is doubled. The procedure terminates only whenever the variable Result (line O6), as modified by the last call of Eval, obtains a True or False value. An important point is that the restarting of an evaluation is not a completely new evaluation process, but it is a process that takes advantage of the recorded results of subcomputations already performed in previous iterations to speed up the current evaluation. Of course, if the formula to be evaluated requires potentially exploring the whole state space (as the case for formulas of the form AG φ, unless a state is found that does not satisfy φ), the procedure would never terminate if the model has infinite states.
This approach, initially introduced to overcome the problem of infinite state spaces, turns out to be quite useful also in the case of finite state systems, since it allows for generation of smaller explanations for the result than the corresponding classical unbounded depth-first version. For example, if we were just looking for a deadlock state, a plain unbounded approach would return, as proof, the first deadlock state encountered according to a plain depth-first exploration of the model, while the bounded approach would return a deadlock state close to the initial state of the model (because all alternative paths up to the current MaxDepth are explored before proceeding more deeply in the exploration).
The second principle regards the on-the-fly approach: the evaluation of a formula, starting from the initial state of the L 2 TS, proceeds in a top-down way with respect to the formula structure and in a depth-first way with respect to the model structure, in agreement with the current maximal evaluation depth limit. The relevant fact of this top-down/depth-first traversal of the formula/model is that only the truly necessary substates and subformulas are analyzed, limiting the 'on demand' generations to a subset of the subformulas instantiations and to a subset of the model state space. Depending on the type of logical operator, a specific evaluation routine is invoked, as shown in Figure 3 . Notably, while EDepth (the current evaluation depth) and MaxDepth are passed to all the specific evaluation subroutines, the local variable RecDepth (initialized with the value O and representing the recursion depth upon which the current Result depends) is passed as parameter only to the subroutines evaluating recursive operators. Figure 4 shows the detailed schema of the evaluation algorithm for the universally quantified 'next' operator. When the evaluation of a formula of the form AX γ φ begins, it is first checked (line O5) if the maximum evaluation depth has been already reached, in which case an Aborted value is returned. The second check is performed (lines O6-O9) to see whether the computation has already been done, in which case the previously saved result is returned. After these checks, the analysis of the possible outgoing transitions from the current state begins. If no outgoing transitions exist (i.e. , the state is a 'final' state) then the formula is evaluated False; this final computation result is saved and this boolean value returned (lines 11-13). If the current state has some outgoing transitions, then all of them (line 16) must satisfy the action formula γ (line 17). To check this, all the transitions are analyzed in sequence for each outgoing transition from the current state.
-A set of substitutions is calculated (line 19) by matching the actual transition label with the (possibly parametric) action formula γ ; if γ does not contain variables, then only contains the empty substitution. -It is then checked (lines 21-33) that the application of at least one substitution in to φ generates a formula which holds in the current state of the transition; the application of the empty substitution returns the formula unchanged.
If a transition is found which does not satisfy γ , then we can immediately conclude that the formula AX γ φ is false, in which case the cause of the failure is recorded (line 45), and the result is set to False (line 46).
The recording of the cause of the failure is necessary for the generation of the full explanation of the final evaluation result, if requested by the user. Whenever the application of a substitution generates a subformula that holds in the target state of the transition, then the information of this partially successful subcomputation is recorded (lines 24-27), and the analysis of further substitutions for this transition is stopped (line 28). We cannot, however yet return True until all the transitions have been analyzed. If, on the contrary, the application of all substitutions generates subformulas that do not hold in the target state of the transition (line 34), then all the already recorded information about successful subcomputations are replaced with the information relative to the failed transition, and the result of evaluation of the original formula is set to False (lines 35-38). There is a last case to be considered:
-If the application of at least one of the substitutions generates a subformula whose evaluation with the current EDepth limit returns Aborted, and -the application of all the other substitutions generates subformulas whose evaluation returns Aborted or False, then it will be no longer possible to return True as an evaluation result, but we go on analyzing the remaining transitions in case a definitive negative answer can still be provided (lines 4O-43).
If for each transition we find a successful substitution, we return True; otherwise, if for some transition we are not able to verify its success, we return Aborted. In any case, the evaluation result is saved and then returned (lines 5O-51).
The 'next' operator of the logic is quite simple, and for this reason, it has been chosen to show the complexities introduced by the incremental bounded evaluation, by the support of parametric formulas, and by the need to collect data for the final explanation of the evaluation result. The main complexity of the logical verification algorithm, however, is encountered when we need to evaluate a recursive operator, like 'until'. To show how to manage this additional complexity, we present in Figure 5 the simplified schema of the evaluation algorithm for the existentially quantified 'until' operator. To keep the schema understandable, we abstract away from already seen details about the existence of evaluation depth limits, dynamic instantiation of parametric subformulas, and explanation-oriented data collection. Also, parameters EDepth and MaxDepth are left for compatibility with the schema in Figure 3 , although they are not actually used, since all the bounded aspects of the evaluation have been omitted for simplicity.
When the evaluation of a formula of the form E(φ 1 χ U γ φ 2 ) begins, it is first checked for whether a 'definitive' or 'temporary' result is already available (lines O5-17). If a 'temporary' result for this evaluation already exists, it means that the evaluation of this formula in this state has already been started previously at a more external recursion level (precisely at the recursion depth given by somedepth). In this case, we return not only the found temporary result, but also an updated recursion depth which identifies the original (still in progress) computation on which this temporary result actually depends. If no such result exists, then this evaluation has been encountered for the first time, and the analysis of the formula continues.
If the current state is a final state, the formula is definitely False; therefore, this value is saved and returned (lines 18-22). Otherwise, we check for whether the current state satisfies the subformula φ 1 . In case of failure, False is immediately saved and returned (lines 24-27). Otherwise, we check whether a transition from the current state exists whose label satisfies the action formula γ (line 31) and whose target state satisfies the formula φ 2 (line 33). If such a transition exists, then the evaluation of the original formula is definitely True, thus the result is saved and returned (lines 34-35). Otherwise, we check whether a transition satisfying the action formula χ exists such that its target state recursively satisfies the whole formula
Before doing that, to avoid looping in presence of cycles in the model, the fact that this computation is now in progress must be saved together with its default (temporary) value False (according to the least fixed point semantics of the operator) and together with a reference to the current recursion depth of the evaluation of the formula (line 4O). Then, the search for transitions over which to apply recursion (lines 41-53) can begin. Notice that the new recursive calls of procedure EvalExistUntil (lines 44-45) are issued with an incremented RecDepth parameter (the value is stored in LastDepth), which allows for keeping track of the current recursion depth.
If a successful application of recursion is found, then a definitive True result for the evaluation can be established, and such value is immediately saved and returned (lines 47-48). If no successful transition (or application of recursion) is found, there are two possibilities: either all the False results returned by the various recursive calls are definitive values, in which case the evaluation definitely returns False, or some of the returned False results are just temporary values actually depending upon outer-level recursive evaluations which are still in progress. These temporary values can be identified because they are associated to the value stored in LastDepth that is lower than the current value of RecDepth. In this case, just a temporary False value is returned, together with a MinDepth value corresponding to the outmost level of recursion on which the result depends (lines 55-57).
There are some important aspects related to the behavior of the update operation that are not explicitly expressed by the shown algorithm. When a definitive False/True value is saved for the current evaluation at a certain level of recursion depth (e.g., line 59), every other previously saved temporary value (related to the result of deeper nested recursions) which happens to depend on the current recursion depth is replaced by the current definitive result. Moreover, at the end of the loop, whenever an updated but still temporary value replaces (line 55) the initial temporary value (line 4O) for the current computation (hence, the initially saved RecDepth is replaced with a smaller MinDepth), all the other already saved temporary results which refer to the original 
Services:
Receive-guarded choice:
value of RecDepth must also be updated by replacing this value with the value of MinDepth. When input models are finite states, the overall complexity of the SocL modelchecking algorithm (in case of non-parametric formulas), is comparable to that of the best on-the-fly model-checking algorithms [Stirling and Walker 1989; Bhat et al. 1995; Fernandez et al. 1996] : it is then linear with respect to the size of the state space and the number of operators in the formula. Of course, in case of parametric formulas, it will also depend on the number of instantiations of all parametric subformulas.
COWS: A CALCULUS FOR ORCHESTRATION OF WEB SERVICES
COWS is a process calculus for specifying and combining services that have been recently developed inside the EU project SENSORIA. Its design has been influenced by some principles underlying the OASIS standard WS-BPEL for orchestration of Web services. In fact, COWS allows concurrent service instances to share (part of) the state, permits the programming of stateful interactions by correlating different actions, and enables management of long-running transactions.
In this section, we report the syntax of COWS and explain its semantics in a step-bystep fashion while modeling a bank service which is part of the automotive scenario of Section 6. We refer the interested reader to Tiezzi [2009] for an in-depth formal account of COWS's semantics, examples illustrating peculiarities and expressiveness of the calculus, and comparisons with other process-based and orchestration formalisms.
Syntax
The syntax of COWS is presented in Table II . It is parameterized by three countable and pairwise disjoint sets: the set of (killer) labels, the set of values, and the set of variables. The set of values is left unspecified; however, we assume that it includes the set of names mainly used to represent partners and operations. The language is also parameterized by a set of expressions whose exact syntax is deliberately omitted. We just assume that expressions contain, at least, values and variables, but do not include killer labels (that, hence, cannot be communicated). Partner names and operation names can be combined to designate endpoints, written p • o, and can be communicated, but dynamically received names can only be used for service invocation. Indeed, endpoints of receive activities are identified statically because their syntax only permits using names and not variables.
Notation· stands for tuples of homogeneous elements, for example,x is a compact notation for denoting the tuple of variables x 1 , . . . , x n (with n ≥ 0). As in the logic, we assume that variables in the same tuple are pairwise distinct. We adopt the following conventions about the operators precedence: monadic operators bind more tightly than parallel composition, and prefix more tightly than choice. We will omit trailing occurrences of 0, writing, for example, p The delimitation operator permits defining and restricting the scope of an element: [e] s binds the element e in the scope s. It is the only binding construct. In fact, to enable concurrent threads within each service instance to share (part of) the state, receive activities in COWS bind neither names nor variables, which is different from most process calculi. Instead, the range of application of the substitutions (of variables with values) generated by communication is regulated by the delimitation operator that additionally permits generating 'fresh' names (as the restriction operator of the π -calculus) and delimiting the field of action of kill activities. Thus, the occurrence of an element is free if it is not under the scope of a delimitation for it. Two terms are alpha-equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by consistently renaming bound elements. As usual, we identify terms up to alpha-equivalence.
Example: A Bank Service
To informally explain the semantics of COWS, we now model the bank service that is part of the case study described in Section 6. The COWS specification of the bank service is composed of two persistent subservices: BankInterface, which is publicly invocable by customers, and CreditRating, which is instead an internal service that can only interact with BankInterface. To show the behaviour of the bank service, we also consider the terms Client 1 and Client 2 that model a pair of mutually dependent requests for charging a customer's credit card with some amount. This mutual dependence is given by the requirement that both clients must agree to charge the credit card in order for the operation to successfully complete: if one of the charge requests by Client 1 and Client 2 fails, no effect is produced with a sort of transactional behaviour.
Thus, the COWS term representing the considered scenario is
The main operator is the parallel composition | that allows the different components to be concurrently executed and to interact with each other. The first occurrence of the delimitation operator [ ] is used to declare that o check , o checkOK , and o checkFail are (operation) names known to the bank subservices, and only to them. The replication operator * , that spawns, in parallel, as many copies of its argument term as necessary is exploited to model the fact that BankInterface and CreditRating can create multiple instances to serve several requests simultaneously. The second delimitation declares the killer label k: it is shared by both clients and is used to coordinate them for ensuring the transactional behaviour.
BankInterface and CreditRating are defined as follows. Whenever prompted by a client request, BankInterface creates an instance to serve that specific request and is immediately ready to concurrently serve other requests. Each instance forwards the request to CreditRating by invoking the internal operation o check through the invoke activity p bank
• o check ! x id , x cc , x amount , then waits for a reply on one of the other two internal operations o checkOK and o checkFail by exploiting the receiveguarded choice operator + , and finally sends the reply back to the client by means of a final invoke activity using the partner name of the client stored in the variable x cust . In case of a positive answer, the possibility of revoking the request through invocation of operation o revoke is enabled (in fact, should the other request fail, the customer charge operation should be canceled in order to implement the wanted transactional behaviour). Revocation causes deletion of the reply to the client, if this still has to be performed. Indeed, execution of kill activities like kill(k ) causes termination of all parallel terms inside the enclosing [k ] operator that stops the killing effect. Notably, if an invocation along the endpoints p bank
• o revoke takes place after a certain number of service instances have been created, then it could be received by any of these instances. Hence, to synchronize with the proper instance, an appropriate customer datum stored in the variable x id is exploited as a correlation value.
Service CreditRating takes care of checking clients' requests and decides if they can be authorized or not. For the sake of simplicity, the choice between approving or not approving a request is left completely nondeterministic here.
The customer processes are defined as follows.
The two processes perform two requests in parallel for charging the credit card 1234 with the amounts 100 and 200. Two different values, id 1 and id 2 , are used to correlate the response messages to the corresponding requests and to coordinate compensation behaviours for revoking credit card payments if one of the two requests fails. Note, that to this purpose, Client 1 knows id 2 and vice versa, and this implements the required mutual dependence. Client i 's continuation for i ∈ {1, 2} is s i in case the operation is authorized otherwise, it consists of invoking the revocation operation of the bank instance corresponding to the other client's request and killing the other client's remaining behaviour by executing a kill activity. 
Computational Steps and LTSs
The operational semantics of the language assigns an LTS to each COWS term (without free variables/labels). To define such LTSs, a set of inference rules is used that explains how terms can interact with their execution environment and which computational activities, that is, forced termination or internal communication, their subterms can be engaged in. The LTS of a term has hence the term itself as initial state, the states reachable from the initial state through sequences of computational steps as set of states, and the set of such computational steps as transition relation (therefore, the operational semantics follows a reduction style). As an important consequence of only considering actual computational steps instead of all potential steps, we have that, in many cases, the LTS associated with a service is finite state, even when the replication operator is used to define persistent services (in particular, all LTSs considered in this article are finite state). Indeed, while service providers are often persistent, their clients usually have finite behaviours and make a finite number of requests, hence their interactions produce a finite number of service instances, and all such terms are involved in a finite number of finite length computations.
An excerpt of the LTS associated with the operational semantics to the COWS term modeling the scenario illustrated in Section 4.2 is shown in Figure 6 . In particular, transitions correspond to computational steps and are hence labeled by actions of the form †, in case of forced terminations, or of the form p • ov, in case of communication of valuesv along the endpoint p • o. In this figure, as well as in Figures 7-10 , arrows of the form −→ denote individual computational steps and arrows of the form denote further unspecified computational steps.
As an example, consider the computation where Client 1 's request succeeds, while Client 2 's request fails (the states it involves are highlighted in the figure by a dark gray background). After the instances of CreditRating communicating these decisions to the corresponding instances of BankInterface, the term describing the scenario is as follows.
This corresponds to state q 18 . After p C
• o chargeOK ! id 1 has been processed by Client 1 , we are in state q 19 , and the preceding term becomes the following. After Client 2 consumes the invocation p C • o chargeFail ! id 2 , we are in state q 23 , and the term becomes the following.
Now, since kill activities must be executed eagerly, the enabled kill(k) is executed, leading to state q 24 , and the term becomes the following.
Notably, the invoke activity p bank
• o revoke ! id 1 is protected and, hence, can still be performed for compensating the effect of the Client 1 's (succeeded) request after the kill has been executed. Therefore, the term evolves into
which corresponds to state q 25 . Finally, after execution of kill(k ), we reach state q 26 and get the stuck term.
CMC: A VERIFICATION ENVIRONMENT FOR COWS SPECIFICATIONS
CMC is a verification environment for SocL formulas over COWS specifications of services. In this section, we illustrate the principles underlying its design and its use.
From LTS to L 2 TS
To implement CMC by fully exploiting the model-checker engine for SocL, we enrich the LTS modeling the semantics of a term with a function labeling each state with the set of communication activities that any active subterm of the COWS term corresponding to that state can potentially perform immediately. This information, indeed, is not present in the LTSs' transition relations, which only take into account actual computational steps, but can be easily retrieved from the syntax of terms. They are important to effectively describe/verify service properties, since they correspond to atomic propositions in as much as computational steps correspond to actions of the logic. Of course, the transformation of LTSs into L 2 TSs preserves the structure (i.e., set of states, initial state, and transition relation) of the original LTS. In particular, for both transition systems, transitions correspond to computational steps and are, hence, labeled by actions of the form † or of the form p • ov.
To transform an LTS into an L 2 TS , we rely on the auxiliary function L(s), which returns the set of communication activities that the term s can potentially perform immediately, that is, not syntactically preceded by other activities and not preempted by parallel kill activities. Formally, it is inductively defined as follows.
where predicate noKill(s, k) (also exploited by the rules of the COWS's operational semantics [Tiezzi 2009 ]), which holds true if s cannot immediately perform an activity kill(k), is inductively defined as follows.
All cases of these definitions are quite straightforward. We only remark that L([k] s)
returns ∅ when noKill(s, k) is false, because due to the prioritized semantics of kill activities, the execution of the communication activities within s is blocked, regardless of whether such activities are protected or not. The next example shows how the function L( ) is exploited during the transformation process to retrieve from syntactical terms state information to be added to an LTS.
Example 5.1. Consider the following COWS term.
The corresponding LTS and L 2 TS are as in Figure 7 . The LTS on the left-hand side says that the term s actually can perform only the computational step corresponding to the communication of the value v along the endpoint p • o. However, besides the activities p • o! v and p • o? x , the COWS term also can potentially perform the receive activity p • o ? x . Thus, to record this information, the state q 0 corresponding to the term s of the L 2 TS on the right-hand side is labeled by a set containing all the three potential activities (since 
2 TS because it cannot be immediately performed by the COWS term, neither before nor after the computation identified by the transition labeled by p • o v .
It is worth remarking that, according to the on-the-fly verification approach described in Section 3, both the LTS and the corresponding L 2 TS associated with a COWS term are generated on-the-fly, on demand of the model-checking engine. Therefore, depending on the formula to be evaluated, only a fragment of the overall state space of such models might need to be generated. 
From Concrete L 2 TS to Abstract L 2 TS
Now, consider again the bank service presented in the previous section. Its LTS is shown in Figure 8 , while the associated L 2 TS is shown in Figure 9 . In the Figures 8-10 , arrows of the form denote multistep computations. Transitions of both systems are labeled with concrete information generated by the operational rules of the calculus. Since we are interested in verifying abstract properties of services, such as those shown in Section 2, we need to abstract away unnecessary details from the L 2 TS model of a service. This is done by using a set of suitable abstraction rules that permits replacing concrete actions on the transitions with abstract actions of SocL, that is, request (i, c), responseOk(i, c), responseFail(i, c), cancel(i, c), and undo(i, c) . Similar rules permit replacing the concrete activities labeling the states with predicates of SocL, for example, accepting request(i), accepting cancel(i, c), and accepting undo (i, c) . Of course, in doing these further transformations, different concrete actions can be mapped into the same SocL action. Moreover, the transformations may involve only those concrete actions/activities that are considered worthwhile to be observed to carry on the analysis of interest. Those that are not replaced by their abstract counterparts may not be observed.
The abstraction procedure must, however, preserve those names and values occurring within concrete actions/activities of COWS specifications that are important for expressing properties of service behaviour. To capture such names and values, transformation rules can make use of metavariables, written as names starting with the character "$"; otherwise, they can use the wildcard " * ". To minimize the introduction of new notations, we write v . to indicate that v can be either a value, a metavariable, or the wildcard (this notation also applies to tuples, actions, and predicates with a similar Fig. 9 . Excerpt of the L 2 TS for the bank scenario with concrete labels. meaning). Take also into account that the wildcard can only occur in the left-hand side of the abstraction rules. Formally, abstraction rules match the following templates.
where α . is a closed action and π . is a closed atomic proposition of the logic SocL (except for, possibly, the occurrence of some of the metavariables introduced in the left-hand side of the same rule). Rules following template (1) apply to concrete actions of transitions, while the remaining ones apply to concrete activities labeling states.
To define the effect of the application of abstraction rules to an L 2 TS, we exploit an auxiliary partial-function match t ( , ) that checks the matching between tuples of the form ( p . , o . ,v . ), drawn from the left-hand sides of abstraction rules, and tuples of the form ( p, o,w) , drawn from concrete actions/activities, and(in case of success) returns a substitution. This function is defined by the following rules.
When using the left-hand side of a rule to build the tuple p . , o . ,v . , if any of p . or o . is missing, it is replaced by the wildcard, while ifv . is missing, it is replaced by one or more tuples of wildcards of appropriate length (as drawn from the COWS specification according to the tuples of values that can be exchanged along the endpoints matching p .
• o . ). In practice, each abstraction rule applies to the largest possible set of concrete actions/activities according to function match t ( , ). Omitting any of the elements in the left-hand side of the rule then corresponds to enlarging its application domain.
For example, the abstract L 2 TS of the bank scenario shown in Figure 10 is obtained by applying the following abstraction rules to the concrete L 2 TS of Figure 9 .
Thus, as a consequence of the application of the first rule, the concrete action p bank
• o charge p C , 1234, 200, id2 that matches the left-hand side of the rule and produces the substitution {$id/id2} is replaced by the SocL abstract action request (charge, id2) that is obtained by applying the produced substitution to the right-hand side of the rule. Similarly, as a consequence of the application of the last rule, the concrete action p bank
• o charge ? x cust , x cc , x amount , x id labeling state q 0 and matching the left-hand side of the rule is replaced by the SocL atomic proposition accepting request(charge). Notably, concrete actions corresponding to (internal) communications between the bank subservices are not transformed and, thus, become unobservable (the corresponding action in the abstract L 2 TS is ∅). Of course, the sets of transformation rules are not defined once and for all but are application-dependent and, thus, must be defined from time to time. Indeed, they embed information, like the intended semantics of each action and the predicates on the states, that are not coded into the COWS specification. Therefore, to verify abstract properties of a service-oriented system, one has to provide a specification of the system consisting of a COWS term and a set of abstraction rules; then, the construction of the associated L 2 TS can be automatically performed. One advantage of keeping the specification separated in two parts is that once the concrete part (i.e., the COWS term) is given, many different abstractions could be considered in order to analyze the system with respect to different views (possibly at different levels of abstraction). Notably, our notion of abstraction only aims at making the specification and analysis of service-oriented systems simpler and more flexible, which is different from homonymous approaches (e.g., [Clarke et al. 1994; Dams et al. 1997] ) that instead aim at reducing the state space of models. Indeed, as we have said before, our abstraction preserves the structure of the model under analysis, that is, the concrete LTS and its corresponding abstract L 2 TS have the same numbers of states and edges.
COWS Model Checking
In the end, CMC embeds the SocL model checker presented in Section 3 below a layer that automates the (on-the-fly) generation of abstract L 2 TSs from services described in COWS, thus enabling the verification of SocL formulas over COWS terms (see {accepting request(charge) } Fig. 10 . Excerpt of the L 2 TS for the bank scenario with abstract labels. Figure 11 ). By the way, CMC can also be used as an interpreter for COWS: it takes a COWS term as an input and analyzes it syntactically; if the analysis succeeds, the tool allows the user to interactively explore the computations arising from the term. Figure 12 shows a screenshot of the CMC's interface where a COWS term, a set of abstraction rules, and a SocL formula are represented. A prototypical version 2 of the tool can be experimented via the Web interface at http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/cmc/, or by downloading from the same address a binary distribution (for Linux, Solaris, Windows, or Mac OS X platforms).
The CMC core consists of a command-line-oriented version of the model checker, which is a stand-alone program written in Ada. This executable core is wrapped with a set of CGI scripts handled by a Web server to provide it with an HTML-oriented GUI. The core has also been wrapped into an appropriate set of Java classes, thus obtaining a Java stand-alone application equipped with a handy graphical interface and a plugin for the Eclipse environment.
The current version of CMC is not targeted to the verification of extremely large systems, although our tool can perform an exhaustive state analysis of systems with several tens of thousands of states. Notably, due to the on-the-fly nature of its model-checking procedure, CMC does not necessarily need to generate and explore the whole state space. This feature improves CMC performance and makes it able to also deal with infinite state systems.
CASE STUDY: AN AUTOMOTIVE SCENARIO
In this section, we introduce the case study that will be used to illustrate our verification methodology. We start by providing an informal description of the scenario by making use of UML-like diagrams, then we present a formal specification in COWS.
Scenario Description
The scenario is inspired by one of the case studies in the area of automotive systems defined and analyzed within the EU project SENSORIA [Koch 2007 ] and describes some functionalities that likely will be available in the near future. A brief description follows.
While a driver is on the road with her/his car, the vehicle's sensors monitor reports a severe failure which results in the car being no longer driveable. At this point, the failure handler installed in the in-vehicle computer system invokes an assistance service that, in turn, contacts some garage, car rental, and towing truck services, and tries to order them. To be authorized to order these services, the assistance service has to deposit a security payment on behalf of the owner of the car, which will be given back if ordering the services fails.
A UML-like activity diagram of the assistance service using UML4SOA, an UML profile for service-oriented systems [Mayer et al. 2008] , is shown in Figure 13 . As usual, bars denote fork and join nodes, while diamonds denote decision and merge nodes. The assistance service is instantiated by a request from an in-vehicle computer system, received through the UML action SevereFailureAssistance, and consequently orchestrates the other services to reach its goal. The request is uniquely identified by the value of the input parameter id, which is subsequently used for correlation purposes. Then, the created instance invokes the bank to charge the driver's credit card with the security deposit amount. This is modeled by the action CardCharge for charging the credit card whose number is provided as an output parameter of the action call. If the credit card charge fails (e.g., there are not enough funds in the driver's bank account), the driver is informed by means of the FailureNotification action.
Services ordering is modeled by the UML actions OrderGarage, OrderTowTruck, and RentCar. When the assistance service makes an appointment with the garage, the diagnostic data are automatically transferred to the garage, which could then be able, for example, to identify the spare parts needed to perform the repair. If the order of the garage fails, the assistance service tries to make an appointment with the rental car service by indicating the location of the stranded vehicle where the car has to be handed over to the driver. Instead, if the order of the garage succeeds, the service concurrently tries to make an appointment with the rental service by indicating the garage location as destination for the rental car and, with the towing service, providing the locations of the stranded vehicle and of the garage in order to tow the vehicle to the garage.
Besides interactions among services, the workflow described in Figure 13 also includes activities using concepts developed for long-running business transactions (e.g., OASIS WSBPEL TC [2007] ). These activities entail fault and compensation handling, that is, specific activities attempting to reverse the effects of previously committed activities, which are an important aspect of SOC applications. According to the UML4SOA profile, the installation of a compensation handler (represented by a dashed box) is modeled by a dashed edge labeled by the stereotype compensation and its activation by an activity labeled by compensate . Specifically, in the considered scenario, the following conditions hold.
-The security deposit payment charged to the driver's credit card must be revoked if ordering the services completely fails, that is, both garage/tow truck and car rental services reject the requests. -The garage appointment has to be canceled if ordering a tow truck fails. -The rental car delivery has to be redirected to the stranded car's actual location if ordering a garage fails or a garage order cancellation is requested. -Instead, if ordering the car rental fails, it should not affect the tow truck and garage orders.
COWS Specification
The automotive scenario can be modeled by the following COWS term.
where, to better illustrate the use of correlation, we consider two cars reporting a severe failure. Notably, Bank is the COWS term
The COWS term Car i representing an in-vehicle computer system is defined as follows.
SensorsMonitor i | GpsSystem i | FailureHandler i
When a severe failure (e.g. , an engine failure) occurs, a signal (raised by SensorsMonitor i ) triggers the execution of the FailureHandler i and activates the corresponding recovery service. FailureHandler i , the most important component of the in-vehicle platform, is defined as follows.
This term picks one of those alternative recovery behaviours whose execution can start immediately. The recovery behaviour s engfail executed when an engine failure occurs is as follows.
Basically, the recovery service contacts GpsSystem i to get the car's location, invokes the Assistance service by providing its partner name p car i , a correlation identifier id i , the car's location (stored in x carLocation ), the diagnostic data (stored in x diagnostic Data ), and the driver's credit card number ccNum i , and, finally, waits for the messages notifying the positive or negative outcomes of the request processing. For the sake of presentation, we relegate the specification of the remaining components of the in-vehicle platform, that is, SensorsMonitor i and GpsSystem i , to Fantechi et al. [2010] . The COWS term Assistance, modeling the assistance service, is defined as follows.
The replication operator is used here for specifying that the assistance service is persistent, that is, it is capable of creating multiple instances to serve several requests simultaneously. Once instantiated, the service contacts the service Bank to charge the driver's credit card with a security amount. Whenever charging the credit card fails, the service sends a notification message to the invoking car and terminates. Otherwise, it installs a compensation handler that takes care of revoking the credit card charge and proceeds with the ordering phase. Activation of the compensation activity requires a signal cardCharge (i.e., an internal message identified by x id to guarantee uniqueness) along p assistance
• o undo and, as we will see soon, takes place whenever both garage and car rental orders fail.
Ordering tries to order three suitable on-road services (i.e., Garage i , TowTruck j , and RentalCar k ), by first contacting the garage, then the car rental, and (possibly) the tow truck. It is defined as follows.
[
If ordering the garage fails, the rental car service is invoked by indicating that the rental car has to be handed over to the driver at the stranded vehicle location (term RentalCarOrdering atStrandedCar ). Whenever ordering the rental car also fails (indicated by the receipt of a signal along the endpoint p assistance • o order RentCar Fail ), the compensation of the credit card charge is invoked by sending a signal cardCharge along the endpoint p assistance
• o undo . Otherwise, in case of success of the garage ordering, the tow truck and rental car (to be handed over at the garage location, term RentalCarOrdering atGarage ) orderings concurrently start. Moreover, a compensation handler is installed; it will be activated whenever tow truck ordering fails and, in that case, attempts to cancel the garage order (by invoking operation o cancel ) and to compensate the rental car order (by sending a signal rentCar along the endpoint p assistance
• o undo ). Finally, when both ordering activities terminate (the endpoint p assistance
• o end is used to appropriately synchronize their terminations), if ordering the tow truck failed, the compensation of the garage order is invoked, and whenever ordering the rental car also failed, the compensation of the credit card charge also is activated.
TowTruckOrdering is simply defined as follows.
RentalCarOrdering atGarage is defined as follows.
The term RentalCarOrdering atStrandedCar is defined similarly; the major difference is that the rental car is requested to be handed over at the stranded vehicle location rather than at the garage location.
OnRoadRepairServices results from the composition of various on-road services and is defined as
Garage services can be defined as follows.
• o cancel ? x id . kill(k) ) ) For simplicity, success or failure of garage orders is modeled by means of a nondeterministic choice. The other on road services can be modeled in a similar way.
The complete specification, written in the 'machine readable' syntax accepted by CMC and including the services not explicitly shown in this section, can be found in Fantechi et al. [2010] . The corresponding LTS, analyzed in the next section, has about 50,000 states.
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY
In this section, we demonstrate feasibility and effectiveness of our methodology by using it to analyze the automotive scenario specified in the previous section. First, we verify over the COWS specification of the scenario the abstract properties of services introduced in Section 1 and formalized as SocL formulas in Section 2. Then, by applying a different set of abstraction rules, we target our analysis to specific services of the scenario (e.g., the bank service). Finally, by changing the abstraction rules again, we focus on low-level service behaviours, such as compensation handling.
Analysis of Service Properties
We start the analysis of the automotive scenario by verifying if its main service, that is, the Assistance service, enjoys the abstract properties expressed as SocL formulas in Section 2.3. To this end, we focus our observations on the assistance service by providing the following abstraction rules to CMC.
Action p assistance
• o severeFailure , * , $id, * , * , * → request(road assistance, $id)
According to this abstraction, the service accepts a request for the interaction road assistance when it receives an assistance request message from a car computer system, and replies with a positive response when an order (of garage/tow truck or of rental car) succeeds. Indeed, in this case, the driver may continue its journey. If, during the request processing, some operation fails (e.g., the bank does not accept the request of charging the driver's credit card), the service replies with a negative response. More specifically, in the case of complete success, two actions responseOk(road assistance, $car) are performed and no action responseFail(road assistance, $car) is observed, while, in the case of complete failure, some actions responseFail(road assistance, $car) are performed and no action responseOk(road assistance, $car) is observed. By means of the last abstraction rule, each state that can accept requests for interaction road assistance is labeled by the atomic proposition accepting request(road assistance). Now, by using CMC, we automatically check the SocL formulas (1)- (12) of Section 2.3 over the obtained abstract L 2 TS. To do this, we instantiate those generic formulas over the recovery service by simply replacing any occurrence of the generic interaction name i with road assistance. The results of the verification of these properties with CMC are summarized in Table III , where we also report the number of states considered during the evaluation and the execution time taken by CMC for the evaluation of a formula (as a single formula per CMC session). Time measures appearing in Tables III-VI The results show that the assistance service is available (indeed several instances of the service can be created at any moment) and, hence, parallel, non-sequential, and non one-shot. Since there exist some execution paths that lead to complete success, that is, no negative responses are provided, the service is not off-line. Moreover, since it does not permit canceling requests and does not accept undo calls (i.e., the atomic propositions accepting cancel (road assistance, var) and accepting undo(road assistance, var) do not hold in any state), it is trivially non-cancelable and non-revocable. The service also exhibits the desired characteristic for being responsive, that is, it provides at least a response, but it is not reliable, because it may produce no positive responses to a request. Finally, the fact that the service is neither single-response nor multipleresponse means that, in some cases, it provides two responses (e.g. , in case of complete success), and in other cases, it provides only one response (e.g., when the credit card charge is denied by the bank). Due to the on-the-fly nature of the model checker, the verification times depend directly on the number of generated states: for the presented case study, such times range from a fraction of a second to the order of a few minutes. Actually, most of the execution time (about 97%) is being spent by the activity of generating the abstract L 2 TS of the model, and only a fraction of the execution time is directly related to the complexity of the evaluation of the formula. This fact is clearly put in evidence when all 12 formulas are evaluated inside the same CMC session. In this case, the L 2 TS is generated once and used several times for the evaluation of the various formulas. The result of this experiment is shown in the last line of Table III ; we can observe that only 4 minutes and 51 seconds are needed to evaluate all 12 formulas, versus the 4 minutes and 41 seconds needed to evaluate just the first formula.
An important role of model checkers is the ability to provide a small fragment of the system state space as a witness or as a counterexample for a checked property. During the design phase, when it is likely that the specification still contains errors and precise guidance in identifying them is essential, the possibility of using the model checker in a way similar to that of a debugger turns out to be very useful. In particular, while a success result from the model checker at validation time would be a sufficient response, during development, in case of a failure result, the user usually needs not only a counterexample in term of abstract occurred actions (the labels of our L 2 TS) but also a precise view of how the COWS term actually evolved, with an indication of the concrete actions which were executed at each computational step of the counterexample.
Once a SocL formula has been checked, CMC can provide, if requested, all the details related to the specific witness/counterexample, which explains in depth the result of the evaluation of the formula. In Figure 14 , we show the counterexample generated by CMC for the formula checking the one-shot property for the assistance service. This formula asserts that in each state reached after accepting a road assistance request, the service is not able to accept further requests. The counterexample indeed shows how the evaluation of the formula proceeds along the system path C1 −→ C2 −→ C4 −→ C6 −→ C8, which is a full path, along which a request is accepted (transition C6 −→ C8), leading to a state (C8) where a further request can be indeed accepted (proposition accepting request(road assistance) holds). At each evolution step, both the abstract and concrete actions are reported. We can also investigate the request-response relation for the assistance service in more detail. To do this, we first define a different abstraction of the scenario by providing CMC with the following rules. (road assistance,var,rentalCar) ∨ responseFail(road assistance,var,rentalCar) true
Similarly, we can verify that a positive response is never followed by a negative one (and vice versa) for the same order.
(F3) AG [responseOk(road assistance,var,order) ] ¬ EF responseFail (road assistance,var,order) true responseFail(road assistance,var,order) ] ¬ EF responseOk (road assistance,var,order) true These last four properties are indeed satisfied by the second abstraction of the service, as shown in Table IV .
Analysis of Other Services of the Automotive Scenario
By changing the abstraction rules applied to the concrete L 2 TS modeling the automotive scenario, we can verify the abstract properties of services introduced in Section 1 (and possibly some specific variants of them) over other services also appearing in the scenario. For example, we consider GpsSystem 1 , Bank, and RentalCar 1 , and apply the following rules.
Action p gps
For the obtained abstraction of the case study, by using CMC, we verify that the service GpsSystem 1 is available and reliable (properties (F5) and (F6) in Table V , which are expressed as instantiations of the generic formulas (1) and (12) of Section 2.3, where i has been replaced by the interaction name gps1). Similarly, we check that services Bank and RentalCar 1 are available (properties (F7) and (F10), instantiations of formula (1) with i replaced by charge and rental car1, respectively), and that Bank is strong revocable, that is, after a successful response to a credit card charge request, the bank accepts undo requests for the successfully completed transaction (property (F9), instantiation of the strong variant of formula (7) with i replaced by charge). Finally, we prove that Bank and RentalCar 1 satisfy the following formulas, stating The results of the verification of these properties with CMC are summarized in Table V . 
Orchestration and Compensation Properties
This set of rules is obtained by putting together some of the rules previously introduced with some new rules for capturing interactions with garage, tow truck, and rental car services. Now, we can check the following properties for the automotive scenario.
-After a successful credit card charge, the rental car will be booked, the garage and tow truck will be ordered, or the credit chard charge will be revoked. (garage,var) true )
The results of this verification are summarized in Table VI .
FINAL REMARKS AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we review and compare related work and point out several distinctive aspects of our approach to the verification of SOC systems.
We use a class of rich L 2 TSs as semantic models of the behavior of SOC systems. Our L 2 TSs have both labeled transitions (typical of LTSs) and labeled states (as in Kripke structures). Usefulness of such a kind of models has been recognized by now in many contexts. For example, P/T systems [Kindler and Vesper 1998 ] have been introduced for Petri Nets modeling, State-Event LTSs [Lawford et al. 1996 ] for real-time modeling, Action-and-State Labeled Markov Chains [Baier et al. 2004] [Müller-Olm et al. 1999; Chaki et al. 2004; Chaki et al. 2005 ] for software verification. However, almost all efforts towards the formal verification of SOC designs through model checking (a wide survey of the approaches based on WS-BPEL is presented by van Breugel and Koshkina [2006] ) rely on either LTSs or Kripke structures. In this way, a direct representation of the state/event duality, which naturally belongs to SOC systems, is lost. Moreover, our L 2 TSs are rich because their states are labeled by sets of structured predicates and their transitions are labeled by sets of structured events. Both events and predicates have the form of tuples of data values (static labels, integers, boolean, strings, names), which can either result from the evaluation of statically encoded literals or from the dynamic evaluation of the result of a computation (e.g., the dynamic creation of a unique new name).
Our methodology shows a novel use of temporal logics and model checkers. The properties to be checked are expressed in the logic SocL in a way that can be independent from the model of the system under analysis; then, through an abstraction process, the model is tailored to be checked against the properties of interest. In fact, the approach usually followed in concurency theory (e.g., [Moller and Stevens 1999; Victor and Moller 1994; Bouali et al. 1994] ) is quite different: typically the properties are formalized in the logic after the system under consideration has been specified and in terms of the actions occurring in it, which implicitly requires the effort of identifying the 'intended meaning' of the actions occurring in the specification. Instead, we make this effort explicit by means of the definition of appropriate abstraction rules. This has some important advantages that make our approach largely applicable. On the one hand, the formulas predicating, availability or responsiveness of a service, for example, are the same, irrespective of the domain of the service, which may be a bank, a booking service, a shipping service, or any other kind of service. On the other hand, they are also independent of the precise syntax of actions in the service specification.
Another point in favour of our approach is that since the logic interpretation model (i.e., L 2 TSs) is independent from the service specification language (i.e. , COWS), it can be easily tailored to be used in conjunction with other SOC specification languages. To this aim, one first has to define an L 2 TS-based operational semantics for the language of interest and then a suitable set of abstraction rules mapping the concrete actions of the language into the abstract actions of SocL. Therefore, the choice made in the presented case study of starting from a UML4SOA description of the architecture and later proceeding with a COWS formalization is not a key of our approach, since after the abstraction step, the origin of the concrete model becomes rather irrelevant. For example, ter Beek et al. [2008] have formalized a similar automotive case study as a set of UML state machines, but after an appropriate abstraction step, that formalization could undergo the same verifications shown here.
We have chosen to tailor our methodology to COWS rather than to a different service specification language for two main reasons. Regarding highe-level specification languages, equipping them directly with a semantics in terms of L 2 TSs would be a very challenging task. Instead, we could also apply our methodology to some of them, for example, WS-BPEL, SRML [Fiadeiro et al. 2006] , and UML4SOA [Mayer et al. 2008] , by profitably exploiting their encodings into COWS [Lapadula et al. 2007; Bocchi et al. 2009; Banti et al. 2010] . Regarding the many other process calculi for SOC that have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [Carbone et al. 2007; Lanese et al. 2007; Boreale et al. 2008; Bruni et al. 2008; Vieira et al. 2008; Guidi et al. 2006; Busi et al. 2006] ), our preference for COWS, (besides the existence of the previously mentioned encodings) is motivated by its mechanisms and primitives that have proven to be particularly expressive for modeling the behaviour of service-oriented applications (e.g. , the scenarios modeled by Lapadula et al. [2008] ). In fact, kill activities are effective for representing ordinary and exceptional process terminations, while protection permits naturally representing exception and compensation handlers that are supposed to run after normal computations terminate. Even more crucially, the correlation mechanism permits automatically correlating messages belonging to the same interaction, hence avoiding mixing up messages from different service instances.
Other innovative aspects of our approach are related to SocL. To take advantage of the richness of the underlying semantic model (i.e., L 2 TS) SocL integrates the action paradigm with propositions that are true over states. This facilitates the task of formalizing properties of service-oriented systems that can be quite cumbersome to write down in pure action-based or pure state-based logics, since it is often necessary to specify both state information and evolution in time by actions. SocL has many commonalities with UCTL ], a logic recently designed to express properties of UML statecharts. In fact, they share the same logical operators, combine the action paradigm with predicates that are true over states, and are both interpreted on L 2 TSs by exploiting the same on-the-fly model-checking engine. The main difference with UCTL is that SocL formulas are parameterized by data values, which make them suitable for effectively expressing service properties that are based on correlation data. As we mentioned in Section 1, in the loosely coupled context of SOC systems, correlation is emerging as a powerful mechanism for linking together actions executed by a component as part of the same interaction. This simple concept has many instantiations. For example, in WS-Addressing [Gudgin et al. 2006] , correlation data are implicitly dealt with (by the underlying communication protocols), thus resulting in a less flexible mechanism with respect to that provided by WS-BPEL, where instead correlation data must be explicitly dealt with by the developer and must be included among the data used for invoking service operations. These different levels of abstraction are somehow reflected by the process calculi for SOC proposed so far, which may be roughly classified in session-based, like those proposed by Carbone et al. [2007] , Lanese et al. [2007] , Boreale et al. [2008] , Bruni et al. [2008] , Vieira et al. [2008] , and correlation-based, like those proposed by Lapadula et al. [2006 Lapadula et al. [ , 2007 , Guidi et al. [2006] , Busi et al. [2006] , respectively.
Other relevant proposals of action-and state-based logics are SE-LTL [Chaki et al. 2004] and SE-A [Chaki et al. 2005] . The former logic is basically an extension of LTL that permits referring both to states and events of Labeled Kripke Structures. Thus, it mainly differs from SocL because it is linear time and is not structured in terms of state, path and action formulas. The authors show that the problem of verifying SE-LTL formulas over Labeled Kripke Structures can be reduced to that of verifying LTL formulas over Kripke Structures. Instead, SE-A is a universal branching-time temporal logic for which an efficient model-checking algorithm directly handling both states and events has been provided. Different from SocL, negation can be applied only to atomic propositions, and the set of logic operators is not fixed in advance, since any ω-regular language can serve as a (universally quantified) temporal operator. Above all, both SE-LTL and SE-A do not permit specifying parametric formulas.
Actually, most of the technical complexity of our logic comes from its parametricity, which has proved, however, to be fundamental to capturing correlation data during the evaluation of formulas and, hence, to link together actions belonging to the same interaction. Anyway, logics with parametric formulas have already been proposed in the literature. Many logics for expressing properties of value-passing processes (e.g., Lin [1993] , Hennessy and Liu [1995] , Dam [1996 Dam [ , 2003 , Ferrari et al. [2003] , Yang et al. [2004] , Tiu [2005] , Mateescu and Thivolle [2008] ) permit the instantiation of subformulas with dynamically generated values. Most of them deal with systems capable of communicating with their execution context and use parametric formulas that can only express properties of such communications, that is, they cannot state properties depending on the messages exchanged in communications between components of the system under analysis. Moreover, communication does not exploit pattern matching, which is instead quite useful for checking actions correlation in the service-oriented setting. Also different, in the use of the logic SocL typical of the verifications made with CMC, properties of internal communications can be stated and verified, since the labels of the corresponding transitions carry sufficient information; instead, potential communications with the context are not even taken into account because the operational semantics of COWS does not allow them to take place. We consider this as a major limitation of our approach and plan to overcome it in the near future (see the next section). Parametric formulas have been also used in the logic for expressing properties of calculi with process distribution and remote actions introduced by De Nicola and Loreti [2004] and in its extension with stochastic features ]. However, the parameters are only used in a limited way for capturing source and/or target localities of actions and making the properties depend on their identities. As far as we know, ours is the first general-purpose framework which is able to deal with formulas parametrization and general, dynamic, on-the-fly, possibly multiple, formulas instantiation.
Two other related logic-based approaches to the specification and verification of service-oriented systems have been proposed by Fu et al. [2005] and by Abreu et al. [2007] . The first one presents the static analysis tool WSAT that takes as an input service specifications written in, for example, WS-BPEL and WSDL, and after a few translation steps, produces a Promela specification. This specification is then used as a model to verify the desired system properties (written in LTL) through the model checker SPIN. While this approach satisfactorily captures the control flows of static Web services, different from ours, it does not handle many important behavioral aspects, for example, dynamic establishment of communication channels (to dynamically determine the peer to talk to), dynamic service instantiation, and correlation sets. The second approach employs SRML [Fiadeiro et al. 2006 ] to specify service-oriented architectures and introduces a logic to express the properties of interaction protocols. The approach is quite different from ours because while the SRML logic is targeted to the description of the properties of a single client-server long-running interaction, we focus on the analysis of service-oriented systems possibly involving many client-server interactions. Moreover, the SRML logic is based on a fixed, standardized set of interaction and communication mechanisms, while in our case, the user is free to define his/her own set of communication and interaction patterns. In fact, SocL permits expressing properties about any kind of interaction pattern, such as one-way, request-response, one request-multiple responses, one request-one of two possible responses, etc. Indeed, properties of complex interaction patterns can be expressed by correlating SocL -observable actions using interaction names and correlation values.
CONCLUSIONS
We have tackled the problem of analyzing the functional behaviour of formal specifications of service-oriented computing systems. To this end, we have defined SocL, a temporal logic capable of representing distinctive aspects of services and have used it to express a set of desirable functional properties of services. We have also developed a bounded, on-the-fly model-checker engine for this logic and on top of it, we have built CMC to check satisfaction of SocL formulas with COWS terms. By means of a case study, we have illustrated an application of our logical verification methodology: first, single out a set of abstract properties describing desirable specific features of the service under analysis; then, express such properties as SocL formulas; finally, exploit CMC for verifying satisfaction of the formulas with the COWS specification of the service.
The approach presented here has been fully implemented as a freely available multiplatform interpreter and model checker designed around efficient verification procedures, which exploits the on-the-fly evaluation approach to minimize the need of state space generation. Our goal was to develop an in-house model-checking engine which can serve as a test bed for experimenting with different temporal logics for service-oriented systems, with efficient (hence, scalable), on-the-fly verification procedures (even if the verification of extremely large systems were not considered among the short-term goals), and with different kinds of user interfaces. For example, the CMC Web-based interface nicely integrates model exploration, verification, and minimization in an interactive context, independent of the client platform (it just needs a browser) and does not require installation of any piece of software. Instead, CMC core command-line-oriented binaries permit easy integration of the tool within other frameworks (like Eclipse plugins or graphical Java interfaces).
Our approach is not intended to be applied as it is to the development of industrial service-oriented applications; nevertheless, the usage of COWS, a formalism for which mappings already have been provided for different industry-level SOC modeling languages (WS-BPEL [Lapadula et al. 2007 ], UML4SOA [Banti et al. 2010] , SRML [Bocchi et al. 2009 ]), paves the way for such development. Furthermore, the patterns of service properties defined in Section 2.3 give an abstract view independent from actual service descriptions, and the usage of such patterns can be automated in principle so that a user need not delve into the technical details of SocL. The approach and the tool presented can hence serve as the (formally sound) basis on which an industrial-strength SOC development and verification environment could be built.
Finally, we leave for future work the extension of our environment to support a more compositional verification methodology. In fact, systems of services can currently be analyzed only 'as a whole', since computations requiring communication with external (i.e. not explicitly modeled) components are not taken into account. This is related to the original semantics of COWS that follows a reduction style (albeit the transition labels are rather informative); the 'symbolic' operational semantics of COWS introduced by Pugliese et al. [2009] should permit overcoming this limitation, and we intend to rely on it for implementing future versions of CMC.
